INTRODUCTION TRADITIONAL ECONOMICS HAS BEEN BASED on methodological individualism.
Until quite recently, with some rare exceptions, it has not been appreciated that this method can be, or perhaps I should say, should be, extended in describing social decisions to include dependence of individuals' utility on the utility or the actions of others. Except under rare circumstances, such interactions produce externalities. These externalities typically slow down movements toward socially beneficial equilibria but in the most extreme cases they will create long-run low-level equilibrium traps that are far from socially optimal. Much of the existing literature is analytically complicated and the models appear quite special. It may therefore be of some use to strip the logic to the bone. I will do so in the form of three rudimentary models that will demonstrate the externalities involved in social interaction. One model presented is analogous to the Newtonian theory of gravity; the special case of this model that illustrates the low level trap is analogous to the three-body problem. A potentially productive outcome of this discussion is a characterization of groups that are of sufficient size to encompass the externalities so that coordination within those groups can attain the social optimum.
The emerging theory of social'interaction, including some of the recent work of Becker and coauthors, gives an alternative to the early work of Becker, in which social decisions were based on individual values.2 Social interaction theory explains why social decisions-such as the demand for education, the practice of discrimination, the decision to marry, divorce, and bear children, and the decision whether or not to commit crimes-are not simple choices based primarily on individual considerations. There is a significant difference between these social decisions and the conventional economic decision-making epitomized in intermediate microeconomic theory as choices among alternative fruits available at the supermarket. This lecture will explain why rational choice analysis of social decisions must take into account the externalities involved in social decision-making. In principle, the analysis is an extension of Becker's earlier work; but in important special cases the incorporation of these social factors into rational choice analysis results in behavior that more closely corresponds to the intuition of sociologists than of economists. For example, the abstract models presented here will explain the existence of social class and linguistic dialect.
The key difference between social decisions and conventional economic decisions (e.g., the choice of fruits) is that the social decisions have social consequences whereas economic decisions do not. While my network of friends and relatives are not affected in the least by my choice between apples and oranges, they will be affected by my educational aspirations, my attitudes and practices toward racial discrimination, my childbearing activities, my marriage or divorce, and my involvement in drugs. All of these activities will affect who I am in an important way, and thus how I associate with my friends and relatives, as well as who those friends may be. As a consequence, the impact of my choices on my interactions with other members of my social network may be the primary determinant of my decision, with the ordinary determinants of choice (the direct additions and subtractions from utility due to the choice) of only secondary 2Previous highlights in linking social interactions with economic theory include Schelling (1971) , Loury (1977) , Jones (1984) , Frank (1985) , Axelrod (1986) , Kolm (1994) , Benabou (1993 Benabou ( , 1996 , Crane (1991), Durlauf (1993) , Bernheim (1994) , Greif (1994) , Brock and Durlauf (1995) , Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) , Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996). Epstein and Axtell (1996) have developed a computer simulation program that is capable of generating models with social interaction.
Becker's early work (for example, Becker (1971 Becker ( , 1964 Becker ( , 1968 Becker ( , 1973 Becker ( , 1974 Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977), and Becker and Murphy (1988)) did not take into account social interactions; in the intermediate stage of his career he showed special circumstances in which social interactions, if present, were not important since the externalities could be captured within the group. More recent work by Becker, has moved into the area where social interactions play a key role. For example, Becker (1991) has explained the popularity for crowded restaurants through social interaction and Becker and Murphy (1993) have examined the implications of advertising.
Of course sociology is all about the importance of social interactions and the whole extensive literature on social networks concerns the implications of social interactions. The classic theoretical perspective on this is given by Merton (1968) . Any review of the literature should start there. Of course the dominant theme of social psychology is also social interaction.
Probably the model closest to the work here is the tradition model in Jones (1984) . I have also written four previous papers on this topic (Akerlof (1976, 1980, 1985) , Akerlof and Yellen (1994)). importance. A proper theory of social decisions then must first spell out their consequences for social exchange.
In social decisions externalities abound. Externalities are important either when people try to distance themselves, in social space, from their friends and relatives (status seeking), or alternatively, when they try to move themselves closer (conformist behavior). I will first construct a pair of general models that demonstrate these externalities. I will then describe a specific model that abstractly roots people in social space, and explains the stability of class structure. The predictions of this model accord with the ethnographic and biographical sketches of life in the United States inner city that I will review.
It turns out that the examination of ethnographic and biographical sketches is necessary in order to discern the presence of social interaction. Empirical estimates tend to demonstrate that neighborhood effects are statistically significant and important3 and there is no disagreement at all about the importance of family variables on behavior, but there is a fundamental problem of identification in interpreting both the neighborhood and, similarly, the family background effects, as evidence of social interaction. Borjas (1995) has found that the slow rate of convergence for different ethnic groups can be explained mainly by neighborhood fixed effects; Crane (1991) has found that approaching the bottom of neighborhood quality there is a jump in the incidence of social problems for individuals with fixed socioeconomic characteristics; and Case and Katz (1991) have found the behavior of individuals in poor areas of Boston is correlated with the behavior of others in the same and adjacent one or two block neighborhoods. In each of these cases the evidence is consistent with social interaction, but could also have a variety of other explanations (see Manski (1993) ). The neighborhood characteristics may be predictive of unobserved individual characteristics that affect behavior but were omitted from the prediction equations; Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) show that endogeneity of neighborhood choice could account for the observed neighborhood effects without any effects from social interaction. A further problem of identification arises if neighborhood characteristics are indicative of exogenously determined neighborhood characteristics that affect children's performance-such as expenditures on schooling -even though the effect on performance does not operate through social interaction. The analogous problems of identification occur in the interpretation of coefficients of family characteristics in regressions of performance. This identification problem can only be resolved at a sufficient level of detail that it is possible to impute individuals' motives. For this reason we shall turn to ethnographies and biographies, which entail a level of thick description at which it may be possible to discern unambiguously the presence of social interaction.
SIMPLE MODELS OF STATUS AND CONFORMISM
Status seeking and conformism can be illustrated by a pair of simple reductionist models. In each model the agent chooses a variable x to maximize an indirect utility function. As in Robert Frank's Choosing the Right Pond (1985), in the case of status behavior utility depends positively on the difference between the individual's own status and the status of others. In contrast, in the case of conformist behavior, utility declines as distance between the individual's behavior and that of everyone else increases. Both of these twin models have representative agents, so that, in equilibrium everyone behaves in exactly the same way and "the behavior of everyone else" is well defined. These models show, as is already well known, that if people are either conformist or statusseeking, their behavior generates important externalities. Although the equilibrium outcomes are the same for all individuals in these models, they represent status-seeking or conformism because ex ante people would prefer to be respectively better than others in the status-seeking model, or more like others in the conformist model.
The Status Model
In the status model the individual chooses the status-producing variable x to maximize the indirect utility function 
The Conformist Model
We shall now examine the alternative case-of conformity-in which the individual wants to minimize the social distance between herself and others.4 In this case she does not seek to be better than other people, but instead wants to 4The classic work on the economics of conformism is Jones (1984). be as much like them as possible. I will later explore some of the reasons why individuals want to conform.
In the twin model on conformity, the utility function is (3) U=-d1x-xI-ax2+bx+c.
The agent loses utility dlx -ii from failing to conform to others. As before, x has an additional intrinsic utility of -ax2 + bx + c. And, in equilibrium, since everyone is alike, 
Quadratic Utility
It is important to recognize that the existence of multiple equilibria in the conformist model is sensitive to the choice of utility function. As the distance between the representative individual and others goes to zero, the marginal utility of moving closer, in the utility function given by (3), does not fall to zero. If, in contrast, the utility function were quadratic, of the form
there would be only one equilibrium value of x-precisely at the optimum value of x = b/2a. Although there is conformist behavior with this quadratic utility function, the multiple equilibria disappear because the marginal utility of x is nowhere discontinuous. I have considered utility functions of this sort-with the marginal utility of decreased distance vanishing at zero-to be a special case. As discussed below, in an analogue to a gravity model the marginal utility of moving closer at zero distance would be at the opposite extreme-not zero, but infinity.
A MODEL OF SOCIAL DISTANCE
The "representative agent" models presented so far ignore individual differences and as a result make it difficult-if not impossible-to illustrate the existence of subgroups that behave differently from the majority of the population. The potential existence of such groups-subgroups in the population with their own norms and values-is one of the most important consequences of social interaction theory. We shall now introduce sufficient heterogeneity into the previous models to show how social interaction can produce such groups, which can be interpreted as stable subcultures or social classes.
In broad terms, the new heterogeneous model can be described as follows. As before, each individual must choose a decision variable x and there is an inherent benefit associated with each potential choice of x. To introduce heterogeneity in social interactions, I shall let individuals occupy different locations in social space. Social interaction, which is represented as mutually beneficial trade between individuals, will increase with proximity in this space. Current social location is acquired and dependent on the decision x, but past social location for each individual is inherited. Both the acquired and the inherited social position affect social interactions-reflecting the social aspects of the adage on my friend's living room pillow: "It is better to be nouveau than not riche at all." Finally, to complete the model, individuals are given static expectations about the positions to be occupied by others in social space.
Such a model can portray stable groups in low level equilibrium traps because individuals' incentives to choose x to conform with those whose inherited social locations are close may overwhelm their incentives to choose x for intrinsic reasons. This is a model of conformist behavior because those who are closer in social space are more likely to interact. Therefore there is an incentive to conform, with a further bias toward conforming to those who are initially close by in inherited distance; just as firms, geographically, have an incentive to remain close to their current customers, individuals too have good reason not to abandon their relatives and current friends, who, by analogy, are their current customers for social exchange.
Because one dimension of social location is geographic, the concept of social proximity yields a generalization of a geographic model.5 Sociologists have a 5The concept of social geography and its implications are inspired by the work of Krugman (1990 Krugman ( , 1991a Krugman ( , 1991b Krugman ( , 1992 ) on economic geography. whole lexicon of their own for what might be considered "social geography." Important concepts in sociology are, for example, social networks and reference groups, usually comprised of individuals who are socially close.
Although the trades influenced by position in social space may be economic, we conceive of them primarily as social. We shall give a positive value in the model to the benefits from social interaction, as would occur from love and friendship. However, with no change in the behavior of the model, with the inclusion of a negative constant term the social interactions could yield negative benefits. Such negative benefits from social interaction may also reflect reality since not all social exchange contributes positively to utility and fear of negative sanctions, due, for example, to jealousy and envy, are potentially as important a motive for conformity as the desire for the positive benefits of love and friendship. The jealousy and envy of friends, relatives, and neighbors (see Mui (1995) ) result in the same incentives to keep close to one's origins as the positive benefits portrayed in the model, and, irrespective of whether the total returns from social exchange are positive or negative, the model gives the same negative marginal incentives of social distance and similar analyses of behavior.
Benefits from Trade and Social Location
To generate examples of the behavior I have described it will be necessary to give functional form to the benefits of social interaction between individuals at different locations in social space. I shall follow the common practice of basing trade, and, correspondingly, also the benefits of trade, on a "gravity" model. In a pure gravity model the trade between two countries is proportional to the GNP's of the respective countries (analogous to their respective mass) and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. In practice, to estimate such models (for example, Frankel and Wei (1993)) some modifications are usually made to this pure formulation. For our purposes we shall make two modifications. In the gravitational model in physics (Feynman (1963, p . 7-1)) with the force of attraction inversely proportional to the square of the distance, attraction increases without bound as the distance between the two masses approaches zero. Adoption of this exact formula to represent social exchange would place excessive benefits on proximity in social exchange. To dampen the effects of proximity I will therefore modify the formula so that as distance approaches zero the benefits from trade will rise but not without limit. I also want the concept of social distance to be a bit richer than would be captured in a pure gravity model since I want social exchange to depend jointly on the differences between peoples' current positions and also their inherited positions. A formulation that incorporates both of these desirable modifications to the pure gravity model assumes that trade depends on the inverse of the product of a constant plus the inherited social distance and a constant plus the acquired social distance. This product substitutes for the square of the distance in the canonical gravitational model of trade. In the pure case in which the constants are both zero and there is no distinction between the acquired and the inherited social position, this will be an exact gravity model of the benefits from trade.
These modifications of the gravity model to the volume and benefits to trade yield the expected value of the benefits of trade between i and j as: e/(f + do ij)(g + de ij), where do ij is the initial social distance between i and j and d is the expected final social distance between i and j. This functional form has several beneficial features. First, as in the earlier conformist model, in the neighborhood of d = 0, there is still some marginal benefit from closer relations, but not infinite, as in the unmodified gravity model. Second, as either the initial or the acquired social distance between a pair of individuals increases, the value of social exchange between them declines asymptotically toward zero.
Intrinsic Returns to Choice of x
The variable x plays two roles in this model. First, it determines acquired social position; but the variable x also has an intrinsic economic value. For example, education is an important determinant of earnings. As in the twin models of status and conformity, we posit that the intrinsic value of x is We shall first give a simple example where convergence to a social optimum does not occur. We shall then describe ethnographic evidence that shows that the clustering illustrated by our example accords with experience, leading to nonoptimal choices in education, child-bearing, and racial discrimination.
A SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF CLASS STABILITY
Figure 1 depicts a simple three-person example. This figure shows the inherited social positions of three persons: 1, 2, and 3. In this figure the inherited social distance between 1 and 2 is small, but the inherited distance between 1 and 3 and also between 2 and 3 is large. In addition, 3's initial position is close to the social optimum b/2a.
If 1 and 2 are initially fairly close to each other and 3 is fairly distant-as pictured-and if the value of social exchange is sufficiently high relative to the intrinsic value of x, there is one stable solution in which 1 and 2 will exchange each other's positions while 3 will choose a point that is close to the economic optimum, only slightly influenced by the possibilities of trade with 1 and 2, because they are socially distant. The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix. This outcome occurs if xo1 and x02 are sufficiently close to each other, if x03 is sufficiently distant, and if the value of social exchange relative to the marginal intrinsic value of x is sufficiently high. And, since person 3 does not much value trade with persons 1 or 2 since she is initially so socially distant from both of them, she chooses a value of x that is close to the economic optimum value of b/2a.
Commentary
The manner in which expectations are formed plays an important role in determining the nature of the equilibrium of the model. With rational expectations, either in the three-person model or in its generalization described above, the social optimum with x equal to b/2a for all individuals is a possible equilibrium. Indeed, when expectations can be altered so that everyone expects the social optimum to be achieved, in fact it will be. Later we shall describe two While it is useful to point out the similarities between the social distance model and the Newtonian model of gravity, the analogy is not complete and the differences are also of some interest. We have already discussed the modifications made from the analogue to a pure gravity model in our formula for the gains from social interaction. We have made a further modification to the Newtonian system by deriving the law of motion of the system from the equation for "force" in quite a different fashion. The gravitational law of motion in physics is derived from the formulae for force by the assumption that "an object responds to a force by accelerating in the direction of the force by an amount that is inversely proportional to the mass of the object" (Feynman (1963, p. 7-1) ). Instead of deriving such a differential equation for acceleration, the law of motion in our system comes from a difference equation, in which each person chooses his/her best social position on the assumption that the position of others will remain unchanged. This difference in construction of the law of motion may qualitatively change the nature of long-run equilibria. If we had assumed that the system was initially at rest and derived the law of motion in the social location model analogously to the physical gravitation model, the long run would always collapse to the single point with all individuals choosing x at the social optimum, equal to b/2a. However, with the assumed choice-theoretic law of motion of our social system, it is quite possible not to get such a collapse. Each person chooses where he/she wants to be next period; they choose their point given where everyone else was in the previous period; there are solutions, as just pictured, in which there is no convergence to the social optimum. In the previous example if persons 1 and 2 were located at exactly the same point in social space, there would be a stable long-run equilibrium with persons 1 and 2 at that point and person 3 close to the social optimum, b/2a.
It is also useful to note that the preservation of a stable system does not necessarily depend on the property that the marginal utility of getting closer falls to zero as the distance approaches zero. We could easily imagine a situation in which individuals have no mass, but there are groups massed at given points in social space. Each individual finds that his/her optimum choice of x is exactly the value of his/her inherited social location. It is a nonmarginal decision to part from his/her subgroup because they have a measurable mass even though the marginal value of departing from a single individual just a little bit happens to be zero.
The astronomical analogy of concentrations of mass in stars and planets offers insight into important features of the social and economic landscape, particularly the division of society into different social classes with distinctive manners and customs. As discussed in the introduction, the existence of social clustering due to social interaction is hard to establish from econometric evidence. But the existence of stable dialects for subgroups of the population can only be interpreted as due to the clustering of social interactions such as modeled in this paper. (See also Durlauf (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (1995) .) Thus dialects act as a diagnostic for social interaction. In discussing the model, we emphasized that the variable x could be interpreted as the choice of education, but alternatively, x could represent pronunciation or language, with the model showing theoretically why there might be a correlation between a choice variable, such as dialect, and subcultural membership. Massey and Denton (1993) relying on the intuitive notion that differences in dialect reflect social distances argue that the increasing disparity between White and Black English in the United States signals growing effective racial segregation. William Labov, a modern-day version of Shaw's Professor Higgins, has painstakingly analyzed the differences between White and Black speech.6 The studies of Labov and his colleagues reveal that Black English of different metropolitan areas has converged, while it has been simultaneously diverging from Standard American English. Massey and Denton have interpreted these findings as a symptom of the slow pace of integration in the United States.
In the model we pictured both members of the conforming group, 1 and 2, as choosing too little of the variable x, in contrast to 3, who chose close to the optimum quantity. Viewing x as education, the model predicts that education may be underpurchased (relative to the welfare optimum) by the conforming group, which we shall later identify with inhabitants of the urban ghetto. Similarly, the variable x could represent drug consumption, with the model symmetrically predicting overconsumption in the ghetto relative to the welfare optimum. This could occur if 1 and 2 conform to each other's overconsumption 6See Labov (1972 Labov ( , 1975 ) and also Labov and Harris (1986). Also see Baugh (1983) . of the variable x, drugs, while the distant 3 chooses her value of x close to the economically maximizing level. Whyte's interpretation of Doc's motivation translates into a theory of the demand for education that differs substantially from the standard model (due to Becker). While it may be true that Doc, like everyone else, pursues his education up to the point where the marginal benefit of extra education is equal to the marginal cost, the relevant cost includes not just lost wages, tuition, and the disutility of schoolwork-the ordinary interpretation of those costs. In addition the cost of the additional education includes the lost contacts with others. In the standard model with lost wages, tuition, and the disutility of the additional effort as the major costs of education, educational choices involve few externalities. In contrast, if the cost of education includes disutility from deviation from others in one's social network, the potential for large externalities is apparent. These externalities explain why even with generous scholarship aid available, students from low-education backgrounds commonly drop out too early while those from high-education backgrounds may stay in school too long.
CLASS STABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE
The Ethnographies, like Rainwater's and Whyte's, tend to sample ordinary people. In Behind Ghetto Walls especially we meet young people, typically hopeful for the future, and then observe how the forces for conformity with the life of the ghetto turn these hopes sour, as these young people follow everyone else around them. In contrast, biographies of those who have escaped the ghetto or working class offer a different perspective. If our theory of social conformity is correct, upward class mobility, especially out of the ghetto, must be fraught with difficulties that are only surmounted by the exceptional.
Probably the most revealing autobiography in this respect is Manchild in the Promised Land, the autobiography of Claude Brown (1965), who grew up in Harlem in the 1940's and 50's. By the age of eight he had already been shot while attempting a robbery, had set his own house afire, had been hit by both a car and a bus, and been thrown into the Harlem River. By luck he was sent to the Wiltwyck School for Boys, a special reform school where under the influence of the counselors, he decided to reform. He worked days, attending remedial high school at night; but in order to make it he found it necessary to remove himself physically-to Greenwich Village-away from his family and friends. In the lingo of the model their social distance at prep school was too great for psychological comfort; but then when they returned home to the inner city they were, similarly, ill at ease. A close mentor of Eddie's, who had also gone to prep school from the inner city, later graduating from Yale, explained the psychological tension:
"So that leaves people on the street. And how in the hell is he supposed to talk to them? ... this kid couldn't even play basketball. They ridiculed him for that, they ridiculed him for going away to school, they ridiculed him for turning white. I know because he told me they did." (Anson (1985, p. 205) ).
This mentor viewed Eddie's death as a suicide induced from the stress of living in two separate and dissonant cultural worlds.
Richard Rodriguez' autobiographical essay (1982) depicts the clash in cultures between the customs and language of his Mexican-American home and the Gringo culture that he learned in school and at college. Rodriguez recounts with feeling that his family (especially his extended family) considered him increasingly alien, just as Eddie Perry's peers in Harlem no longer considered him Black, because of what he had learned at prep school. Rodriguez recounts that as English became his dominant language: "Pocho then they called me. Sometimes, playfully, teasingly, using the tender diminutive -mi pochito. Sometimes not so playfully, mockingly, Pocho. (A Spanish dictionary defines that word as an adjective meaning 'colorless' or 'bland.' But I heard it as a noun, naming the Mexican-American who, in becoming an American, forgets his native society.)" (Rodriguez (1982, p. 29) ).
Although they lived at opposite ends of the continent and came from different ethnic backgrounds, and although one life ended in tragedy while the other continues as a remarkable success, Eddie Perry and Richard Rodriguez bore psychological costs of educational attainment that were strikingly similar: in the one case there was the cost of being labeled a White man in a Black neighborhood, in the other case there was the cost of being labeled a Gringo by his extended family. For both there was also the difficulty of living in the culturally alien white world. These were perhaps the costs that Doc, a generation earlier, had decided not to bear when he had made the opposite choice-to be a streetcorner boy, and not a college boy.
Stack's All Our Kin ( around to see if their work is being appreciated by the adult and teenage worlds around them. The absence of a favorable response takes away the fun.
Economists have modeled the demand for children as if they were consumer durables. But children are a special kind of consumer durable whose enjoyment is enhanced by hobby clubs of other mothers and adoring relatives who share the pleasures of the new models. And, if everyone else is a member of a baby club, it is lonely to stay out. Thus, for example, Alice Walker chose to be a welfare mother rather than a secretary because the road to becoming a secretary was lonely, whereas being on the dole made her one of the gang.
FURTHER OBSERVATIONS WITH POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the social distance model described above each person chooses her respective position in social space under the static expectation that the social positions of others would remain fixed. In the equilibrium this assumption turned out to be roughly true, since 1 and 2 were close and they merely interchanged positions. And 3 did not change her position much either. However, in special situations people may expect others to move in tandem rather than to remain in place, generating a motive for social movement that is normally absent. Interventions in a closed environment that attempt to change the social position of an entire social network simultaneously and, as a consequence, to alter the expectations of the individuals in the network about their neighbors' behavior can be quite successful in generating major social change. In terms of the model if everyone is expected to change their social position to the economic optimum, then that optimum will be the new equilibrium.
In practice the best known intervention where such a change in expectations most likely occurred is Eugene Lang's famous offer to give a college scholarship to every student of a sixth grade class in Harlem. Of the 51 students who remained in the New York area, 40 were considered likely to go to college six years later. Even more remarkable, all of these students could easily have obtained either scholarships or loans in the absence of Lang's program. (See  Ellwood (1988, pp. 125-126 ).)
How then should we account for this success? One possibility is that Lang was successful because he put a lot of resources into the program and actively engaged a dedicated social worker who organized group activities, enlisted the support of parents, and also intervened at students' times of crisis. Lang did not just offer the money and then walk away from the children to await later claims for scholarship money, if any.
An alternative explanation is that the experiment was successful because the students formed a cohesive group in which each member received reinforcement from others who, like themselves, were on the academic track toward graduation from high school. In terms of the model each individual student would expect to be more isolated from her peers if she dropped out than if she kept up with her school work. Additionally, these students were perceived by the community as the recipients of a rare bit of good luck. By pursuing this unusual opportunity, the community would not identify members of the class as departing from behavioral norms.8 Both of these explanations -in terms of group dynamics and in terms of signaling-conform to our model of social distance. The students took advantage of Lang's rash promise because they could do so without creating great social distance between themselves and their social network.
Another social intervention commonly cited for remarkable results occurred in two New Haven schools in the 1970's. In this case too the intervention reversed the normal incentives governing behavior. When James Comer and his team (1980) first came to the New Haven schools they found a great deal of anger among teachers, students, administrators, and parents-all of whom were frustrated because they felt that they were being unfairly treated. Comer and his assistants used human relations tools to teach responses that were more constructive than anger. To give one concrete example, Comer taught methods for dealing with misbehavior resulting from children's frustration. He relates the story of an eight-year-old boy who was sent North by his family from North Carolina and was dropped off at school by an aunt on her way to work. When the boy was left in the classroom by the school principal without any introduction, the teacher showed some annoyance at the additional burden. In anger, the eight-year-old kicked the teacher and ran out of the classroom. By creating a school environment in which the teacher was trained to find out the reason for the child's unhappiness and misbehavior, the teacher and the student were able to reach a mutual understanding: the teacher would respect the boy's feelings and the boy would behave. Once the lesson had been learned that understanding, not anger, was the way to deal with difficulties, academic success followed.
Comer tells a vignette that shows that this message had been appreciated by the students (as well as the faculty and parents). When a student new to the Comer school had his foot stepped on, he raised his fists, ready to fight. Told by another youngster "Hey man, we don't do that here," the transfer student read the expressions on the faces of the others around him and dropped his fists (1988, p. 219). By creating a school spirit in which everyone reacted to anger with the attitude "we don't do that here," each member of the school community feared, like the transfer student, at least some degree of ostracism if he did not conform.
In terms of the model, in the old equilibrium anger was acceptable and often contributed to an individual's acceptance in her respective social group. In this equilibrium anger is uninhibited because it contributes positively to social exchange. In contrast, in the new situation, after Comer's intervention, each person understands that anger will have the opposite effect: a show of temper would reduce acceptance by one's peers and even by children on the playground. By reversing the social code for acceptance or rejection, a new socially optimal equilibrium was achieved in which learning could be the focus of attention.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the models presented here are only extensions of the early Becker framework for social decisions, it is my hope that the incorporation of these social externalities provides a broader and more accurate framework for the rational analysis of social choice. In contrast to standard economic models the social distance approach provides insight into sociological phenomena including class structure and patterns of behavior such as dialect.
The pervasive externalities that influence decisions in the social distance model have implications for economic policy. Because group interactions are an important influence on individual decisions, the analysis of social programs must include an evaluation of an intervention's impact on group interactions and not just the direct effects of the program. For example, in education the returns to programs such as art and athletics cannot be measured simply by their direct effects on grade point averages and added earnings of the participants. Similarly, the pros and cons of tracking in the schools depends upon the group interactions that are thereby engendered. Comer's school intervention suggests that with harmonious social relations, academic achievement may be easy to attain, even in schools in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. Conceivably, there could be high payoffs to drama programs that enable students to learn an alien culture and language while curiously pretending that they are not.
Several recent books and reports (see, for example, Eisenhower Foundation (1993) and Schorr (1988)) have endorsed a community-wide, multiple-solution approach to the problems of the inner city. The theory of social interactions might be interpreted as providing a rationale for such an approach. But the analysis here suggests that the community is endogenously defined in terms of peoples' sense of social location. What may appear as a community to an outside reformer (a city neighborhood, for example) may be too large a unit in which to encompass the social interactions involved in social exchange. As Comer has shown, these externalities may be possible to capture in small, near total institutions such as schools. Note that the quantities x1l -x02 and x1l -x03 are both negative in this range, since x1l x02 and also x1l <x03. Differentiating (7) we find that in the range x1l <x02, Note that the sign of the first square-bracketed term changes at x1l =x02 from positive at xO-2 to negative at x0+. If the distance between x03 and xo1, is sufficiently large, and if the intrinsic value of x is sufficiently small relative to the value of the exchange, then the first term dominates the sign of (10) and 8U1/8xll < 0 at x1l =x2. Since 8U1/8xll > 0 at x1l =x-2, this is a point where the sign of the derivative changes-discontinuously from positive to negative. Such a change of sign does not automatically guarantee that x02 is the optimal value of x1l for person 1. 8U1/dxll may turn positive as x1l gets closer to x03: the first term in square brackets becomes smaller in absolute value as x moves away from x02; and the second term in square brackets becomes larger as x moves closer to x03. However, if the initial distance between x02 and xo1 is sufficiently small, and, more important, if the initial distance between xo1 and x03 is sufficiently large, 8U1/8xll will not change sign from minus to plus as x1l approaches x03, guaranteeing that x02 is preferred to any point in the range, x02 <x11 <x03. Finally, in the range x1l > x03, the value of U1 is There is no guarantee that 8U1/8xll is negative in this entire range x1 > x03 when it is negative for x02 <x11 <x03; nevertheless, if the marginal value of intrinsic utility, -2ax11 + b, is sufficiently small, 8U1/8xll will be negative throughout this region. Thus we have found that if the intrinsic value of x is sufficiently small relative to the value of social exchange, and if 1 and 2 are sufficiently distant from 3 and also from b/2a, the optimal value of x1l will be x02.
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A similar proof will show that under these same conditions the optimal value of x12 will be xo1, and x13 will be chosen close to b/2a.
